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I. Introduction 
Movants are legislators who desire fair and unbiased judges to 
decide this important case. They seek to intervene for the limited purpose 
of asking for the recusal of Justice Mary Yu. They do so because while this 
case was pending and being briefed, Justice Yu delivered a speech to WEA-
PAC, the political action committee of the Washington Education 
Association (“WEA”), a member of the Network for Excellence in 
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Washington Schools, one of the plaintiff-respondents. “Where a judge’s 
decisions are tainted by even a mere suspicion of partiality, the effect on the 
confidence can be debilitating.” In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against 
Sanders, 145 P. 3d 1208, 1212 (Wash. 2006). 
II. Name and designation of movants 
Movants are Representatives Matt Manweller, David Taylor, Joe 
Schmick, Mary Dye, Mike Volz, Brandon Vick, Jacquelin Maycumber and 
Cary Condotta and Senators Michael Baumgartner and Doug Erickson. 
Movants have a substantial stake in the outcome of this case. They 
are among the legislators who have negotiated and passed state budgets 
since this case was filed that have dramatically increased K-12 education 
funding. See generally 2018 Report to the Washington State Supreme Court 
by the Joint Select Committee on Article IX Litigation, April 3, 2018 (filed 
April 9, 2018). Combined, they represent more than one million 
Washingtonians whose lives, schools, and pocketbooks are all deeply 
affected by this case. 
Movants also have a personal stake in this matter. The State has been 
held in contempt and fined while this case has been pending. During the 
pendency of the case, the litigants themselves, and even the Court at times, 
have discussed certain degrees of personal liability for legislators, including 
withholding salaries and other financial sanctions, until this case is resolved.  
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Movants make no secret of their support for an amply-funded 
program of basic education as a policy matter. Each endeavors to support 
only legislation which meets the burden of constitutionality. Of course, the 
Court is entitled to its judicial review of questions of constitutionality, and 
movants recognize that they will sometimes reach a different conclusion 
than the Court. Yet movants, as inherently political actors elected by voters 
to pursue articulated policy goals (as opposed to members of the Court, who 
are elected to interpret and apply legal standards to questions of facts and 
law1), have a special interest in ensuring that such judicial review is both 
actually unbiased and appears to the public as unbiased. 
III. Relief sought 
Movants seek to intervene for the limited purpose of moving to 
recuse Justice Mary Yu. Due to the serious issues raised, movants also 
request oral argument on this motion. 
IV. Parts of the record relevant to the motion 
The record relevant to the motion to intervene consists of the elected 
positions as state legislators held by movants and their roles crafting the 
legislation now under consideration by the Court. 
                                               
1 See Code Jud. Conduct 4.1, cmt. 1 (“Even when subject to public election, a judge plays 
a role different from that of a legislator or executive branch official. Rather than making 
decisions based upon the expressed views or preferences of the electorate, a judge makes 
decisions based upon the law and the facts of every case.”) 
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The record relevant to the motion to recuse is publicly available. The 
WEA is a party to this case as one of the plaintiffs, the Network for 
Excellence in Washington Schools, includes the WEA as a member. See 
https://waschoolexcellence.org/about/news-members/.  
On Saturday, April 21, WEA-PAC, the political action committee 
of the WEA, held a conference in Spokane. See Washington Supreme Court 
Justice Criticized for Speech to Powerful Teachers Union, Walker 
Orenstein, Tacoma News Tribune, Apr. 26, 2018, available at 
http://www.thenewstribune.com/news/politics-government/article209855729.html 
(“Orenstein Article”). Here is a picture from the event, with closed 
captioning explaining the crowd’s reaction and a social media comment 
from the official twitter account of the Tacoma Education Association: 
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Here is a sampling of additional posts about the speech made to 
social media website by WEA members in attendance: 
   
Justice Yu and the WEA declined to provide a video or audio 
recording of the speech to the news media. Orenstein Article. According to 
Justice Yu, “[t]here was no question I had an agenda and that was I want 
(teachers) to invite judges into the classroom.” Id. A spokesman for the 
WEA claimed she also spoke about “her path to becoming a Supreme Court 
Justice and the role that education played in her life.” Id. Neither Justice Yu 
nor the spokesman provided any additional information about how long 
Justice Yu stayed at the event, whom she spoke with, or what they talked 
about. Yet posts made to social media websites by attendees indicate that 
Justice Yu met personally with WEA members. Here are a few such posts: 
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V. Argument 
1. Motion to intervene for a limited purpose 
Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in 
an action . . . when the applicant claims an interest relating to the 
property or transaction which is the subject of the action and the 
person is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a 
practical matter impair or impede the person’s ability to protect that 
interest, unless the applicants interest is adequately represented by 
existing parties. 
CR 24(a)(2); see generally Westerman v. Cary, 892 P.2d 1067, 1088 (Wash. 
1994). There is no question movants have timely applied for intervention; 
this motion is filed two weeks after the events that require recusal. 
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The other factors favor limited intervention as well. Movants each 
have a compelling interest in the proper resolution of this case. They 
negotiated and passed budgets that have provided dramatic increases in K-
12 funding, and some of them were among the principal negotiators of those 
budgets. Even more than that, each movant is a member of an institution 
that has been held in contempt and been fined in this case, and each face the 
prospect of seeing their salaries withheld or other personal financial 
sanctions. Each deserves a fair tribunal to decide the constitutionality of the 
Legislature’s work. 
Moreover, as a practical matter, the resolution of this case without 
movants’ intervention may impair and impede their ability to protect their 
interests, and no current party will adequately represent those interests. 
Movants are reliably informed that no current party to this matter will seek 
recusal. Movants deserve the opportunity to argue for recusal before their 
interests in the matter are decided. 
2. Movants have standing 
To the extent the Court may have questions about movants’ 
standing, separate from the merits of their motion to intervene, the answer 
is that they do. “The basic test for standing is whether the interest sought to 
be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to 
be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in 
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question.” Seattle v. State, 694 P. 2d 641, 668 (Wash. 1985) (citation 
omitted). Moreover, “[w]here a controversy is of serious public importance 
the requirements for standing are applied more liberally.” Id. 
Movants have standing in two primary ways. First, and most 
concretely, the outcome of this case could affect their salaries. The litigants, 
and the Court itself at oral argument, have considered whether individual 
legislators should have their pay reduced or deferred until this case is 
resolved. See State ex rel. O’Connell v. Dubuque, 413 P. 2d 972, 976 (Wash. 
1966) (granting standing on whether legislators who voted for pay raises 
could run for re-election; “[q]uestions of salary, tenure, and eligibility to 
stand for public office, all being matters directly affecting the freedom of 
choice in the election process are of as much moment to the voters as they 
are to the candidates, and make this controversy one of public importance”). 
Movants deserve a fair panel to decide issues directly affecting their wages. 
Second, movants are members of an institution which the 
constitution invests with the sole authority, subject only to gubernatorial 
veto, to write state budgets. See generally Legislature v. Lowry, 931 P.2d 
885 (Wash. 1997). The final resolution of this case before this Court is a 
critical step in restoring legislative authority over the state budget. Movants 
have standing to ensure that any decision about such a resolution is made 
by an unbiased panel of judges. 
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3. Motion to recuse 
Under a number of canons of the Code of Judicial Conduct (“CJC”), 
Justice Yu’s actions require recusal in this case. The fundamental, 
overarching rule is that “[a] judge shall act at all times in a manner that 
promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality 
of the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of 
impropriety.” CJC 1.2. While Justice Yu defended her speech to a party in 
this case by noting that “she attends public events between 10 and 15 times 
a month, and that any one of those could be interpreted as political,” 
Orenstein Article, the canons impose a higher standard on judges than other 
elected officials—“[a] judge should expect to be the subject of public 
scrutiny that might be viewed as burdensome if applied to other citizens, 
and must accept the restrictions imposed by the Code.” CJC 1.2 cmt. 2. The 
purpose of that rule, and the primary reason movants are seeking recusal, 
the enduring need for an independent and trusted judiciary in our tripartite 
form of government—as comment 3 to CJC Rule 1.2 explains, “[c]onduct 
that compromises the independence, integrity, and impartiality of a judge 
undermines public confidence in the judiciary.” 
Justice Yu also violated a number of rules of Canon 2 of the CJC, 
that “a judge should perform the duties of judicial office impartially, 
competently, and diligently.” 
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• Under CJC Rule 2.1, the “duties of judicial office, as prescribed 
by law, shall take precedence over all of a judge’s personal and 
extrajudicial activities.” 
• Under CJC Rule 2.2, a “judge shall uphold and apply the law, 
and shall perform all duties of judicial office fairly and 
impartially.”  
• Under CJC Rule 2.4(B) and (C), a judge shall not 
“permit . . . political . . . or other interests or relationships to 
influence the judge’s judicial conduct or judgment” or “convey 
or authorize others to convey the impression that any person or 
organization is in a position to influence the judge.” 
• Under CJC Rule 2.9(A), a “judge shall not initiate, permit, or 
consider ex parte communications . . . concerning a pending or 
impending matter[.]”  
• Under CJC Rule 2.10(A), a “judge shall not make any public 
statement that would reasonably be expected to affect the 
outcome or impair the fairness of a matter pending or impending 
in any court[.]” 
As for extrajudicial political activities in particular, Canon 4 CJC 
spells out specific restrictions for judges in their capacity as political 
candidates, but Justice Yu’s conduct does not find a safe harbor in these 
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rules. Most importantly, a judge may not “make any statement that would 
reasonably be expected to affect the outcome or impair the fairness of a 
matter pending or impending in any court,” CJC 4.1(A)(11), and must “[a]ct 
at all times in a manner consistent with the independence, integrity, and 
impartiality of the judiciary,” CJC 4.2(A)(1). Those rules exist because 
“[e]ven when subject to public election, a judge plays a role different from 
that of a legislator or executive branch official. Rather than making 
decisions based upon the expressed views or preferences of the electorate, 
a judge makes decisions based upon the law and the facts of every case.” 
CJC 4.1 cmt. 1. Compare with Justice Yu’s Comments to news media, 
Orenstein Article (“Yu also said she attends public events between 10 and 
15 times a month, and that any one of those could be interpreted as 
political.”). 
 To be sure, CJC Rule 3.7 allows judges to speak at meetings of 
organizations, but only subject to CJC Rule 3.1, which prohibits a judge 
from “participating in activities that would undermine the judge’s 
independence, integrity, or impartiality,” which has unfortunately occurred 
in this instance. 
The CJC is also quite clear that a “judge shall disqualify himself or 
herself in any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably 
be questioned[.]” CJC 2.11. Actual impartiality is not necessary, for when 
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a “judge’s decisions are tainted by even a mere suspicion of partiality, the 
effect on the public’s confidence in our judicial system can be debilitating.” 
Sherman v. State, 905 P.2d 355, 378 (Wash. 1995). Indeed, when it comes 
to ex parte communications, even “inadvertently obtain[ing] information 
critical to a central issue” requires recusal. Id. at 379. 
The most relevantly similar case is In re Disciplinary Proceedings 
Against Sanders, 145 P.3d 1208 (Wash. 2006). There, Justice Sanders 
visited a facility for sexually violent predators while a case pending at the 
Court involving the sexually violent predator law. Justice Sanders spoke 
with the residents, knowing that the issues they discussed might have 
bearing on the case before the Court. He was admonished by the 
Commission on Judicial Conduct, which this Court (with nine Court of 
Appeals’ Judges presiding) affirmed: the “Commission justifiably found 
that Justice Sanders, with full awareness of the potential for situations that 
could conflict with the Code of Judicial Conduct, embarked on the tour and 
met with litigants who had pending cases before the court.” Id. at 1211. He 
“created a situation that clearly violated both the letter and the spirit of the 
canons and created serious concern for both counsel and fellow jurists about 
the appearance of partiality.” Id. 
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Perhaps most notably, the question in Sanders was whether to 
uphold an admonishment; Justice Sanders himself saw the clear violation 
and voluntarily recused himself in the case. Id. at 1212, n.11.  
Recusal is similarly required here. Justice Yu both spoke at the 
annual political event of one of the plaintiffs here and spent time with 
individual members of the organization. No recording has been publicly 
disclosed, and what facts have been made available creates far more than 
the “mere suspicion of partiality” that required recusal in Sherman.2  
It is hard to square Justice Yu’s claim that she only discussed her 
journey to becoming a judge and encouraged teachers to invite judges to 
classrooms with the fawning social media posts from attendees. Conversely, 
it is easy to understand why the movants, the general public, and other 
parties in this case might take Justice Yu’s assertion with a heavy dose of 
skepticism. Indeed this dichotomy illustrates why recusal is necessary—
even if the speech itself were entirely innocuous, the discussions Justice Yu 
had with attendees before and after the speech raise the suspicion of 
improper communications. Justice Yu has thus, at minimum, created the 
appearance of impropriety. If Justice Yu fails to recuse, “the effect on the 
                                               
2 Sanders arose from the appeal of a decision by the Commission on Judicial Conduct 
following a complaint at that body, which conducted a fact-finding hearing. There may 
well be a similar complaint filed with respect to this situation, but even with only the facts 
currently known, recusal is required. 
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public’s confidence in our judicial system can be debilitating.” Sherman, 
905 P.2d at 378.  
Recusal is the only method available to ensure the public and the 
parties that this case will be decided fairly by an impartial panel.  
VI. Conclusion 
It is the sincere hope of movants that Justice Yu makes the same 
decision that Justice Sanders made and moots this motion by voluntarily 
recusing herself in this case. But if she does not, movants request that they 
be permitted to intervene, and, respectfully, request that she be recused. 
 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, this 8th day of May, 2018. 
   Stokesbary PLLC 
     /s/ Andrew R. Stokesbary   
   Andrew R. Stokesbary, WSBA No. 46097 
   Attorney for Movants  
  Representative Matt Manweller 
  Representative David Taylor 
  Representative Joe Schmick 
  Representative Mary Dye 
  Representative Mike Volz 
  Representative Brandon Vick 
  Representative Jacquelin Maycumber 
  Representative Cary Condotta 
  Senator Michael Baumgartner 
  Senator Doug Erickson 
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